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SOCIAL EQUITY AND CHANGING PRODUCTION PATTERNS: 
AN INTERPRETATION OF THE INTEGRATED APPROACH 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper will examine the applicability to the English-
speaking Caribbean of the study entitled Social Equity and Changing 
Production Patterns: An Integrated Approach. The study was 
prepared by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) and explores the effects of traditional 
approaches to development, which seeks to accord either precedence 
or antecedence to either growth or social equity and asserts that 
any such approach is inherently contradictory. 
Traditionally, economic growth and social equity have been 
presented either as mutually exclusive choices or, at best, 
sequential policy goals, with economic growth having antecedence. 
It was implied that countries had to achieve ^creditable' levels of 
growth before the benefits of that growth could percolate through 
the society. As a corollary, it was also accepted that some 
segments of the society must go through initial hardships, indeed 
such hardships were seen as part of the price that a country had to 
pay for growth. 
Such an approach placed considerable stress on developing 
countries in a number of areas; the least not being the promotion 
of social cohesion. More recently there has been a re-examination 
of such an approach to growth and development. The view is now 
advanced that growth and social equity are not only mutually 
compatible and complementary, but must be viewed as directly linked 
in any development strategy. The document seeks to examine the 
complementarities between growth and social equity and attempts to 
treat them as two essential pillars of a long-term strategy of 
development. 
It acknowledges that there are important social and economic 
differences among the countries of ECLAC. These differences are 
seen no clearer than between the countries of the Caribbean 
subregion on the one hand and the countries of Latin America on the 
other. 
The ECLAC Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean prepared 
a preliminary review of the document which included a section on 
"Some preliminary comments from a Caribbean perspective". The 
purpose of the present paper is to attempt a more in-depth 
application of the perspective of the integrated approach to the 
countries of the Caribbean. 
In an effort to explore the usefulness of the approach to the 
English-speaking subregion of the Caribbean, the present paper will 
first critically review the Santiago document. It will be found 
that one of the underlying central concerns of the document has 
been the increasing social disparities evident in Latin America. 
Any determination of Caribbean applicability will therefore, be 
conditioned by the nature of social disparities evident in the 
subregion. 
The other plank of the document is the inability of the 
countries considered to achieve sustainable levels of development 
while at the same time maintaining internal and external 
equilibria. Once again in determining applicability it will have 
to be decided whether the barriers to growth in the subregion are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained in Latin America. 
Finally, a number of policy suggestions will be offered. 
THesé will not seek to restate those policy suggestions contained 
in thé Santiago document but will attempt to provide responses to 
the peculiar conditions of the Caribbean. 
THE INTEGRATED APPROACH 
The presentation of the integrated approach in the document 
prepared by ECLAC is an attempt to carry the growing consensus on 
the compatibility of growth and equity to a higher level of 
understanding and applicability. It takes social equity to mean 
equality of opportunity, reduction of social inequalities, relief 
of poverty, and security against impoverishment. 
The document argues that the development experience of Latin 
America and the Caribbean has been one of trade-offs between growth 
and equity, instead of these two national objectives being seen as 
complementary. This conceptual problem undergirds a policy mix 
that is marked by the inability of most developing countries to 
achieve a solid foundation of economic growth which would, at the 
same time, allow for social equity. 
it goes further to make the case that any development strategy 
that does not take into account the complementarity of these two 
pillars is problematic by definition. The attempts to give either 
dimension primacy inevitably lead to both social and economic 
disequilibria and sap the society of the very cohesion and 
consensus that is necessary for sustained development. 
It is suggested that countries of Latin America have tended to 
give primacy to economic growth and expansion. However, as argued 
above, these policies were self-defeating. Not only were they 
unable to produce growth, but they also led to a deterioration of 
the living conditions of the populations of the countries 
concerned. Moreover, the cumulative result was intolerable socio-
economic maladjustments, internally and externally. As a 
consequence of these factors, painful adjustment measures had to 
take place and these tended to impact most heavily on the most 
vulnerable groups in society. 
The document focuses on the nature of the existing production 
patterns and makes the case that the problems can only be solved 
through changes in these production patterns. The integrated 
approach is therefore primarily a focus on the range of possible 
domestic action that fall within the capacity of national policy 
makers. It is made clear, however, that the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean operate within an international context 
and therefore, the domestic policy options must be framed against 
that backdrop. The importance of the international context is made 
even more important by the openness of regional economies and their 
heavy dependence on external investment and trade. 
In addition, the rapid changes that are taking place in the 
global economy continue to place stress on regional economies which 
must continually respond to developments in the global economy. In 
^normal' circumstances, developing countries have demonstrated 
difficulties in reacting to international changes. These 
difficulties are compounded in any attempt to establish the 
foundation for anticipatory policies. At present, the changes 
occurring in the global economy are not only doing so at rapid 
pace, but in many ways appear to be contradictory. On the one hand 
there is the move toward a more open world trading system, while at 
the same time the world seems on the road to being divided into 
mega-trading blocs. 
In order to cope with the imperative of development, the 
integrated approach highlights three points of critical importance. 
First, the document makes clear that any notion of a trade-off 
between growth and equity is a non-debate. Growth and equity are 
not only compatible and complementary, but they are also 
inextricable. Accordingly, sustained growth and development are 
not possible without social equity. Should growth be accompanied 
by growing social disparities, social cohesion becomes threatened 
and the very foundations of society are placed in danger. On the 
other hand the desire for social equity can only be accommodated 
within the context of an expanding economic base. 
Secondly, it holds that growth and equity can be achieved 
concurrently as part of a complete policy package conceived as 
such. This aspect emphasizes the importance of a holistic 
conceptual appreciation of the task. 
Thirdly, and from a practical point of view, of greatest 
importance, the means of achieving the goals of growth and equity 
are seen as lying in the alteration of the current production 
patterns. There are three elements that are of central importance 
in the integrated approach - technical progress, the creation of 
productive employment and investment in human resources. The task 
really is to operationalize these elements and in so doing the base 
will be laid for sustainable development. In order to 
comprehensively address these three points, there are certain tasks 
that must be addressed. 
First, there has to be a debunking of the inward-looking 
strategies, focusing on the import-substitution policies, that have 
been the norm in Latin America and the Caribbean. These have to be 
replaced by policies which will foster international 
competitiveness. The trend in the most important and vibrant 
economies in the world is toward globalization and small countries 
will resist or ignore that trend only to their detriment. In 
addition, the import substitution policies of the past have proved 
to be an inadequate basis for international competition. 
Secondly, countries will have to ensure that policies are in 
place which create a climate of economic stability. As a region, 
during the 1980s, Latin America and the Caribbean experienced 
growing fiscal deficits and rising inflation. These factors have 
served to create a difficult climate for economic progress. 
Thirdly, the document identifies the need for a strengthening 
of public finances. It is noted that in comparison to many other 
regions of the world, the incidence of taxation in Latin America is 
quite low and falls disproportionately on those least able to pay. 
Such a strengthening of the public finances could provide an 
enhanced budgetary basis for more acceptable levels of social 
security. 
It is asserted that the survival of the region is dependent on 
the development, absorption and use of technology which will be 
seen as an improvement of the international competitiveness of the 
region. The document advocates technical and financial state 
support for research and development activities which could 
facilitate technical progress. 
The document recognizes the centrality of productive 
employment as a means of ensuring greater social equity and 
identifies training, increased participation of the secondary 
labour force, modernization of labour relations and occupational 
safety, health welfare as important aspects of the promotion of 
productive employment. 
One of the obstacles to increasing productive employment in 
developing countries remains the shortage of capital. Accordingly, 
any development strategy which has social equity as an important 
element will have to focus on ways of increasing capital formation. 
The document identifies four ways of so doing - boosting the 
savings of workers, creating a capital market for investment in 
education and training, funding for projects in small and medium-
scale enterprises and improving the land market. 
The document advocates a comprehensive btiman resources 
development policy which will take into account population 
planning, mother and child health programmes and a revisit of the 
education policies in force. 
One area of the integrated approach, which requires particular 
attention, is the provision of á social security net, especially 
for the most vulnerable groups. The integrated approach 
acknowledges that in any development process there are social 
groups that will be adversely affected, at least in the short run. 
The approach is concerned that the difficulties experienced by 
these vulnerable groups are kept to a minimum. 
Writing from the perspective of the recent history of Latin 
America, the document is concerned to highlight the importance of 
participation and consensus as a fundamental part of the strategy 
of development. 
All the areas identified by the document can intuitively be 
said to be valid areas of concern for building modern societies. 
However, the document is weak in demonstrating two issues. First, 
it does not make the connection between paying attention to these 
areas and changed production patterns, enhanced growth or greater 
social equity. Secondly, it does not create a clear matrix, in 
which the various elements of the approach are shown to be mutually 
re-enforcing; in many ways the policy elements still appear to be 
discreet variables that are being pursued independently of each 
other. It must be added, however, that these criticisms are made 
with the acknowledgement that given the wide range of countries 
addressed by the document it is difficult to achieve high levels of 
specific direction. 
The principal advance of the integrated approach, as 
articulated by the Santiago document is its holistic view of a 
number of policy areas and the attempt to create among them a nexus 
of complementarity to be used as a practical course of action. 
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the policy areas 
emphasized by the document have all been addressed by governments 
in the Caribbean. Consequently, the real issue is whether they 
have been treated as comprehensively as part of an integrated 
strategy and whether there are any significant benefits that could 
be arrived at by so doing. 
CARIBBEAN APPLICABILITY 
The document pays far more attention to the countries of Latin 
America than it does to the countries of the Caribbean o Indeed, as 
far as the Caribbean is concerned, comparative data are submitted 
only on Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. This is 
in part understandable given the far more adequate databases 
available for the countries of Latin America in comparison with the 
countries of the Caribbean. It is for this reason that the 
conclusions of the document need to be examined more closely 
against the available data for the Caribbean before they can be 
accepted. 
The countries of the Caribbean have reasonably adequate 
databases on economic indicators, although many of these are 
compiled with the assistance of international institutions which is 
in itself, an inherent weakness. On the other hand, the available 
data on social indicators are very uneven and more often than not, 
sparse, among the countries of the region. This creates special 
problems for comparison even among Caribbean countries, far less 
between the Caribbean and other countries and has presented the 
present paper with one of its greatest difficulties in critically 
applying the integrated approach to the Caribbean. 
To a large extent in order to achieve some consistency in data 
which could allow comparison of social conditions, there has had to 
be a reliance on the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) 
Human Development Report. It is admitted that there are still 
questions on the methodology of the human development aggregate 
indices; as a consequence, the use of indices, per se, has been 
avoided and as far as possible the primary statistical data have 
been used. 
Methodological considerations 
Data on poverty in the English-speaking Caribbean are sparse. 
There is an adequate database on poverty on Barbados, Guyana, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, all of which have 
institutionalized the household budgetary survey. The other 
countries of the subregion have not yet developed this capability, 
although some work has begun in respect of the Eastern Caribbean. 
What the available data do suggest is that in most Caribbean 
countries social disparities are less than those in Latin America 
and cannot be adequately explained only by the same variables. 
There are three interrelated factors that can be identified as 
providing the basis for a different point of ,departure in the 
analysis of the manifestations of social deprivation in the 
Caribbean as distinct from Latin America. These are physical size 
of the countries; population size; and the reduced importance of 
the rural-urban dichotomy. 
The data at Table I illustrate the differences in size between 
the countries of Latin America, on the one hand, and the Caribbean 
on the other. The geographic size of a country has implications 
for the distribution of a country's national resources, especially 
in terms of many of the amenities which are considered crucial for 
the promotion of social equity such as the provision of water and 
sanitation facilities, health care, etc. Communities that are less 
physically dispersed tend to be easier to service. These 
complications manifest themselves in terms of costs and management 
systems. 
Even though an attempt has been made to present data on the 
rural-urban population distribution in both Latin America and the 
Caribbean this dichotomy could easily be overstated in the case of 
the Caribbean. Given the physical size of most of the countries of 
the Caribbean, the rural-urban distinction is in many respects 
artificial. Such a distinction can more properly be made in the 
case of Belize, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Even in 
these instances, with the possible exception of Kingston, Jamaica, 
the phenomenon of urban problem as found in Latin America is 
radically different to that found in the Caribbean. 
Looked at from another angle, the remoteness of rural 
communities in many Latin American countries is unmatched in the 
Caribbean, which makes access by these communities to social 
amenities far easier. 
The differences in size indicate that macroeconomic policies 
that are valid in the larger Latin American countries may be of 
considerably less use to the smaller countries of the Caribbean. 
The Santiago document lays great importance on the need for 
participation and empowerment on the part of local populations in 
the national development thrust of any country. It notes that most 
countries in Latin America are only now emerging out of fairly 
sustained periods of non-representative authoritarian governments. 
In the case of the Caribbean there has largely been a history of 
institutional stability and participation over the last 30 years 
since these countries started coming to independence. 
Traditional production patterns in the Caribbean 
The traditional production patterns in the Caribbean have been 
criticized by more than one generation of indigenous scholars. The 
argument has always been that these structures were never designed 
to serve the interests of Caribbean societies and thus are 
incapable of doing so. It is not the intention here to go into an 
in-depth economic history of the Caribbean; however, it is 
important to establish the point of departure of the present study 
and the entrenched nature of the forces that shaped the production 
structures of the Caribbean and now mitigate against the 
development of the region. 
It is possible to identify three broad phases characterized by 
conditions, external and internal, which have shaped Caribbean 
development from discovery to the present. The first can be traced 
back to the determination that the countries of the Caribbean 
Table I 
BASIC SELECTED INDICATORS 




% of total 
CARICOM countries Area Pop. US$M (1990) 
— — — — — . — — — — — — — — — — — . 
Antigua and Barbuda 440 63 418.7 31.0 
Bahamas 13942 254 2676.0 • • • 
Barbados 431 259 1720.1 45.0 
Dominica 750 80 171.1 41.0 
Grenada 345 94 200.4 • • • 
Jamaica 11424 2436 3920.0 52.0 
St. Kitts and Nevis 269 44 152.7 41.0 
Saint Lucia 616 152 365.3 • « • 
St Vincent and 
the Grenadines 388 117 191.2 27.0 
Trinidad and Tobago 5128 1253 5094.1 69.0 
SUB TOTAL 33733 4752 14909.6 
Belize 22960 179 364.8 50.0 
Guyana 214970 755 256.5 35.0 
TOTAL 271663 5686 15530.9 
Source: Caribbean Development Bank: 
Social and Economic Indicators, 1990. 
Other Caribbean and Latin America 
Argentina 2767000 31900 53070.0 86.2 
Bolivia 1099000 7100 4520.0 51.4 
Brazil 8512000 147300 319150.0 76.9 
Chile 757000 13000 25250.0 85.6 
Colombia 1139000 32300 39410.0 70.3 
Costa Rica 51000 2700 5220.0 53.6 
Cuba « • • • • • • • • 74.9 
Dominican Republic 49000 7000 6650.0 60.4 
Ecuador 284000 10300 10380.0 56.9 
El Salvador 21000 5100 5860.0 44.4 
Guatemala 109000 8900 8150.0 42.0 
Haiti 28000 6400 2370.0 34.6 
Hunduras 112000 5000 4320.0 43.6 
Mexico 1958000 84600 200730.0 72.6 
Nicaragua 130000 3700 3430.0 59.8 
Panauna 77000 2400 4550.0 54.8 
Paraguay 407000 4200 4130.0 47.5 
Peru 1285000 21200 28610.0 70.2 
Uruguay 177000 3100 7170.0 85.5 
Venezuela 912000 19200 43830.0 90.5 
Source: World Development Report, 1991; and 
Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 1991 Edition. 
should be producers of primary products for metropolitan markets; 
first producers of primary agricultural products and then later, in 
the case of some of the countries so endowed, of other primary 
products. At all times the value added to these primary products 
in the Caribbean has been kept to a minimum. 
The second phase of the establishment of the Caribbean 
production structures began after the Second World War when it 
became evident that the production of primary products could not 
sustain minimum standards of living of the increasing population in 
the region. This did not even take into consideration any question 
of the distribution of the growth which took place, 
This second phase merely built on the first and only served to 
entrench the structures that were already in place. It took the 
form of investment in light manufacturing, designed primarily to 
serve the perceived needs of import substitution. In addition, in 
some countries there was some investment in heavy industry. These 
industries were traditionally inefficient and depended on a variety 
of tariffs, non-tariffs and para-tariffs for survival. As with the 
first phase, the value added in the region was kept to a minimum. 
In effect therefore, the Caribbean found itself with the older 
patterns which remained dependent on protected external markets, 
with these protected markets becoming harder and harder to 
preserve, while the newer efforts depended largely on protected 
domestic markets. This protection was just one manifestation of 
pervasive government intervention in the system of production. 
Caribbean production in most cases was becoming more and more non-
competitive. 
This phase was marked by detailed planning, which in some 
cases, went beyond a detailed sectoral approach and even involved 
enterprise-specific production targets. The result of these 
patterns of production made for a false sense of growth and 
progress. In many cases Caribbean economies showed signs of 
healthy growth in many cases averaging above 6 per cent during the 
1960s. Such signs of growth, however, were conditioned not by the 
autonomous performance of Caribbean economies but more by 
international factors that impacted favorably on them. 
The economic consequences of these strategies came to a head 
for many countries in the region in the international crises of the 
1980s. These crises ushered in the third phase. During this phase 
the focus of economic policy became one of structural adjustment 
organized along the general policy framework lines of multilateral 
financial institutions, particularly the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to a lesser extent, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 
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Caribbean performance since the 1980s 
The 1980s was a decade of considerable global economic stress 
and the countries of the Caribbean with their open economies were 
forced to face rapidly changing challenges. In large measure these 
challenges have persisted into the 1990s with some of them even 
intensifying. One sure lesson of the international developments 
since the beginning of the 1980s has been the fragility of the 
traditional production patterns. In most cases the Caribbean 
economies were able to show very little versatility and there was 
a marked inability to adjust to the changing circumstances without 
serious disruption being suffered by large sectors of the 
population. 
A review of the economic performance of the Caribbean over the 
last 10 years will reveal a wide variation in the rate of growth of 
Caribbean economies over the period. An examination of the 
available data (See Table II) would suggest that it is possible to 
identify three broad categories in this respect. Standing out is 
the economic performance of the smaller economies which had the 
highest levels of growth during the period. These were the 
countries of the DECS, Belize and the Bahamas. The larger 
economies in the region may be divided into two categories. On the 
one hand, there were those which experienced annual average growth 
over the review period of not less than 2 per cent, and these for 
ease of reference we will refer to as the growth economies; 
included in this category is Jamaica. Finally, there were those 
economies which had an average annual expansion of less than 2 per 
cent over the period or actually contracted, among which were 
Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, these we may designate 
non-growth economies. Although it must be noted that during 1991 
the Guyanese economy showed particularly robust growth (in excess 
of 6 per cent according to preliminary estimates). 
These averages in many instances do not give an adequate 
representation of the unevenness that took place in many of the 
economies over a very short period of time; the figures for Antigua 
and Barbuda for 1982 and 1983 are illustrative in this regard; as 
are those for the Bahamas for the years 1984, 1985 and 1986. These 
fluctuations are symptomatic of the fragility most economies in the 
region and their susceptibility to factors over which domestic 
policy makers have little if any control. 
Notwithstanding these data, on closer examination it is 
possible to identify some structural similarities that are spread 
across all Caribbean countries. Table III presents a series of 
largely domestic indicators, while Table IV presents a series of 
external economic indicators. 
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Table II 
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN GDP 
(at constant prices) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Average 
1991 82-91 
Antigua/Barlauda 0.4 6.9 7.5 7.7 9.7 9.0 7.7 5.2 2.8 1.6 5,85 
Bahamas <2> Ó.9 3.2 3.0 13.5 3.6 4.9 4.5 4.0 0.2 • p - 4.3 
Barbados -5.0 0.4 3.6 1.2 5.1 2.5 3.5 3.5 -3.1 -4.1 0.76 
Belize -0.8 0.8 0.8 2.3 2.6 12.5 6.6 14.7 8.9 4.2 5.26 
Dominies 1.9 3.0 5.0 1.7 6.8 6.8 7.9 -1.1 6.6 2.1 4.07 
Grenada 5.3 1.4 5.4 4.9 5.5 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.2 2.9 4.81 
Guyana -10.4 -9.3 2.1 1.0 0.2 0.7 -2.9 -4.7 -3.1 6.1 -2.03 
Jamaica 0.5 2.3 -0.9 -4.7 1.7 7.4 2.9 6.5 4.8 0.2 2.07 
St.Kitts/Nevis 6.8 -1.1 9.0 5.6 6.2 7.4 9.8 6.7 3.0 6.9 0.03 
Saint Lucia 3.2 4.1 5.0 6.0 5.9 1.5 12.1 4.6 4.0 1.7 4.81 
St. Vincent 5.1 5.8 5.3 4.6 7.2 6.4 8.6 7.2 7.1 4.6 6.19 
Trinidad/Tobago 4.0 5.2 -7.1 -4.5 -1.0 -4.6 -3.8 -0.7 -0.2 1.8 -1.09 
Source: ECLAC estimates derived from country data 
<2> Cumulative variation relates to period 1982-1990. 
Table Ill 
ECONCmiC INDICATORS (INTERNAL) (1990) 
Unemployment 
Annual Change of Selected Indicators Central Governn»nt Operations Rate 
Current surplus Overall surplus 
GDP constant Consumer (deficit) as % (deficit) as % 
Country prices prices % of GDP of GDP % 
Antigua/Barbuda 2.8 7.0 (0.4) (2.0) 
Bahamas 0.2 4.7 0.6 (2.2) • • • 
Barbados -3.1 3.1 (0.2) (7.2) 15.0 
Belize 8.9 3.1 6.7 (1.2) • > • 
Dominica 6.6 3.7 2.1 (15.3) • • -
Grenada 5.2 2.6 • • • 
Guyana -3.1 • • . (22.4) (35.4) • • • 
Jamaica 4.8 22.0 7.7 (5.5) 15.3 
Montserrat 13.5 6.8 0.5 (7.4) 1.0 
St Kitts/Nevis 3.0 • • * 0.8 (1.8) • • « 
Saint Lucia 4.0 4.3 6.3 0.8 V « • 
St.Vincent and 
the Grenadines 7.1 9.1 0.4 (1.7) • • • 
Trinidad/Tobago 0.2 11.0 1.0 0.4 20.0 
Source: Cariteean Development Bank: Social Indicators 1990, March 1992. 
In the case of internal economic indicators, the differences 
in nominal growth rates remain evident, as are the divergences in 
changes in the consumer prices. On the other hand, there are close 
similarities throughout the region on structure of central 
government operations. Only Belize (6.7%), Jamaica {1.1%), Saint 
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Lucia (6.3%) operate with current surplus that gives any 
significant measure of leeway. Even in these cases, when the 
overall picture is taken into consideration the similarities 
between this group of three countries and the others in the region 
become even more evident. 
Table IV 
ECONOMIC INDICATORS (EXTERNAL) (1990) 
Balance of Payments External Debt 
Current a/c Debt service Debt Change in 
Current a/c balance as Debt service as X of service net foreign 
Country balance ($USM} X of GDP of X of GOP current revenue X of GDP assets ($USM) 
Antigua/Barbuda (46.2) (11.0) 3.7 18.6 4.7 4.2 
Bahamas (184.9) (6.9) 1.6 8.7 2.3 (23.2) 
Barbados (37.5) (2.2) 7.0 25.5 13.7 (99.7) 
Belize (10.9) (3.0) 4.7 16.6 7.3 34.7 
Dominica (24.9) (14.6) 2.5 8.1 4.1 (21.4) 
Grenada (27.6) (13.8) 1.0 3.6 2.4 37.6 
Guyana (147.1) (57.4) 51.1 96.6 • • . (6,520.4) 
Jamaica (313.5) (8.0) 16.6 48.9 28.5 (74.9) 
Montserrat (18.0) (24.4) 1.4 6.9 4.7 (34.3) 
St Kitts/Nevis (45.3) (29.6) 1.8 8.9 3.1 2.5 
Saint Lucia (57.5) (15.7) 1.6 5.7 1.9 7.0 
St.Vincent and 
the Grenadines (Z.S) (1.3) 2.2 7.4 3.0 36.5 
Trinidad/Tobago 430.0 8.4 9 34.3 19.0 399.5 
Source: Caribbean Development Bank: Social Economic Indicators, 1990, March 1992. 
An examination of external economic indicators shows 
weaknesses on the current account for all countries in the region 
with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago which benefited in 1990 
from the increases in the prices of petroleum and petroleum 
products as a result of the Gulf conflict. A further analysis of 
the countries' foreign payments reveals that in most cases there 
was a net decline in the their foreign assets, with only Antigua 
and Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago registering increases in their 
net foreign assets. 
It is particularly interesting to note that even in those 
economies which experienced high rates of growth in the 1980s, 
there has been some slowing down since 1989. It begs the question 
whether the difficulties which were manifested in the other 
economies during the 1980s will become evident in the growth 
economies in the coming years. If anything, it now becomes even 
more of an imperative to determine mechanisms to address the 
underlying causes of these difficulties. 
13 
Structural adjustment and its social impact 
Barbados, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
have all entered into agreements with one or more of the 
international financial institutions in an effort to cope with 
growing economic disequilibria. In addition, many other countries 
which have not been forced into the arms of these institutions have 
sought to engage in pre-emptive action by adopting policies that 
are similar to those prescribed by the institutions themselves. 
The prevailing model which guides Caribbean economic policy has now 
become that of structural adjustment. 
Structural adjustment approaches the question of economic 
disequilibria with a classical set of free-market policies which 
tend to ignore, or at best, play down their social implications. 
The argument is made by some that the negative social impacts of 
structural adjustment are deliberately ignored by this approach. 
The proponents of the structural adjustment approach counter 
that these free-market policies are essentially a response to the 
heavy-handed state intervention that characterized many developing 
countries. In the case of Caribbean countries, as has been 
discussed above, such statist policies were a hallmark of many of 
the development strategies in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The proponents of structural adjustment also advocate that the 
market is the most efficient vehicle for correcting disequilibria 
which are seen largely as the direct result of the intervention of 
the state in the economy. Included in policies rejected by 
structural adjustment are many of those which the state may have 
set up to raise the standard of living and provide a social safety 
net for the most vulnerable groups, in areas such as social 
security, health, education, subsidization of basic needs, public 
employment programmes. 
The evidence in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, which 
have had the longest experience with structural adjustment type 
policies has demonstrated the tremendous negative social impact of 
these policies. It is to be noted that attempts are made to negate 
any evidence adduced to demonstrate these negative impacts by the 
ingenious argument that social hardships are the result of the 
policies that preceded structural adjustment rather than the 
structural adjustment policies themselves. The experiences of 
countries under policies influenced by this model are nonetheless 
noteworthy. 
Thus, primacy is given to economic growth, which is seen to be 
a function of the market, and it is argued that the benefits of 
economic growth will spread over time through the economy. The 
conclusions of the structural adjustment model cause two immediate 
difficulties. 
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First, advocates of the loodel have offered examples of 
countries in which structural adjustment policies are said to have 
worked. The logic in many of these cases is at the very minimum 
self-serving, since buccess for the structural adjustment model is 
the fulfilment of economic indicators established for the model. 
It can therefore, be contended that the successful fulfilment of 
these indicators which hardly, if ever, have a social and human 
dimension to them, is an insufficient basis on which to judge 
whether a country has been placed in a more favourable position to 
ensure the development of its people. 
Secondly, the fundamental question must be addressed as to 
whether the obvious hardships that are inflicted on the populations 
of countries applying the prevailing structural adjustment model 
are worth the results. 
The structural adjustment approach has been criticized and the 
effects of its policies on the most vulnerable social groups have 
been lamented in the Caribbean. As is to be expected, there has 
been a strong reaction from the labour movement which has 
identified a number of negative effects on labour within the 
region, including rising unemployment, falling real wages, 
increases in poverty, reduction in labour to capital ratios. At 
another level, the concern has been expressed that the countries of 
the region stand to lose much of their economic and political 
autonomy to multilateral institutions and other extraregional loci 
which have no sensitivity to the social requirements of the region. 
There has also been resistance to the structural adjustment 
model from the employers in the region. Naturally, many of them 
focus on trade liberalization initiatives inherent in the approach. 
While in some regard these protestations are self-serving and seek 
to maintain high levels of protection at the expense of the 
Caribbean consumer, there is merit to the argument that developing 
countries are being called upon to open their markets, while many 
developed countries are, at the same time, constructing barriers to 
trade. Employers haye also been moved to take issue with the 
deleterious effects on the vulnerable groups in the population. 
To date, however, there has been no serious effort to offer a 
set of policy alternatives which could be substituted for the 
structural adjustment paradigm. Indeed, in the absence of an 
offering of a valid alternative, a desire for a return to the ways 
of the 1960s and 1970s can be detected. 
The focus on the 1960s and 1970s tends to fall on the high 
nominal growth rates that were in evidence then as an indicator of 
the rightness of the policies of the time. Workers in the region 
see the period as a time of rising wages and increased strengths. 
Employers, on the other hand, identify with a time of captive 
markets, protected behind high barriers, with no need to be 
efficient and pass on savings to local consumers. 
15 
The economic history of the Caribbean indicates that none of 
the models of development pursued to date have been able to lay the 
basis for sustained development in which the economies of the 
region will be less exposed to the vagaries of the international 
system. It is admitted that no national economy can be totally 
insulated from international events and further, given the size of 
regional economies, the problems of international penetration will 
always be present. In addition, any economy will be faced with 
circumstances that are beyond control. The need therefore, is to 
establish structures that can be anticipatory and versatile. 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Social equity in the Caribbean 
At independence, the countries of the Caribbean subregion had 
inherited from the colonial power a rudimentary framework of social 
distribution systems. This framework was patterned on the lines 
existing in the United Kingdom and could have found its roots in 
the Fabian socialism that guided the development of the British 
social system during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
It cannot be denied, however, that whatever social 
redistribution systems the colonial power instituted, its overseas 
possessions were vastly inferior to those that existed in the 
metropolitan centre. Nonetheless the existence of such a framework 
before independence helped to set the stage for a more 
interventionist approach by post colonial governments to the issue 
of social equity. 
The major issue to be resolved in addressing social equity in 
the Caribbean is a determination of the dimensions of the problem. 
The nature of the social disparities in the region is difficult to 
determine in the absence of comparative data. Any attempt at 
analysis is therefore illustrative at best and necessarily 
intuitive. 
Efforts to determine the level of poverty in the region are 
still at the methodological stage. It follows therefore that any 
determination of distribution of poverty within populations will be 
even further off in the future. To cite an example that 
illustrates the dimensions of the problem; in the 1992 UNDP Human 
Development Report, data on the distribution of wealth are provided 
only for Barbados, and only in respect of the "income share of the 
lowest 40 per cent of households", no data were presented for the 
share of highest reward categories. 
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Table V 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
SELECTED SOCIAL INDICATORS 
Human 
Life Adult Mean years development 
Country expectancy literacy of schooling index 
CARICOM countries 
Antigua and Barbuda 72.0 96.0 4.6 .781 
Bahéunas 71.5 99.0 6.2 .875 
Barbados 75.1 98.8 8.9 .927 
Belize 69.5 95.0 4.6 .665 
Dominica 76.0 97.0 4.7 .783 
Grenada 71.5 96.0 4.7 .758 
Guyana 64.2 96.4 5.1 .539 
Jamaica 73.1 98.4 53.3 .722 
Montserrat • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 67.5 92.0 6.0 .686 
Saint Lucia 70.5 93.0 3.9 .722 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 70.0 84.0 4.6 .693 
Trinidad and Tobago 71.6 96.0 8.0 .876 
other Caribbean and Latin America 
Argentina 71.0 95.3 8.7 .833 
Bolivia 54.5 77.5 4.0 .394 
Brazil 65.6 81.1 3.9 .739 
Chile 71.8 93.4 7.5 .863 
Colombia 74.9 92.8 5.7 .848 
Costa Rica 74.9 92.8 5.7 .848 
Cuba 75.4 94.0 7.6 .732 
Dominican Republic 66.7 83.3 4.3 .595 
Ecuador 66.0 85.8 5.6 .641 
El Salvador 64.4 73.0 4.1 .498 
Guatemala 63.4 55.1 4.1 .485 
Haiti 55.7 53.0 1.7 .276 
Honduras 64.9 73.1 3.1 .473 
Mexico 69.7 87.3 4.7 .804 
Nicaragua 64.8 81.0 4.3 .496 
Panama 72.4 88.1 6.7 .731 
Paraguay 67.1 90.1 4.9 .637 
Peru 63.0 85.1 6.4 .600 
Uruguay 72.2 96.2 7.8 .880 
Venezuela 70,0 88.1 6.3 .824 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 1992 • 
Table V lists selected social indicators for the Caribbean and 
for Latin America. These data were drawn from the 1992 UNDP Human 
Development Report and were selected because to a large extent they 
afforded comparison between the Caribbean and Latin America. It 
would have been more desirable to use a wider range of indicators, 
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given the major gaps in data gathering that exists in the 
Caribbean. The paucity of data is demonstrated by the 
unavailability of data on any of these indicators for Montserrat. 
On the measure of life expectancy only Belize, Guyana and 
Saint Kitts and Nevis have average life expectancies that are under 
70 years, and in the case of Belize the shortfall is only 0.5 of a 
year, and in the case of Saint Kitts and Nevis 2.5 years. There is 
even a better showing on the measurement of adult literacy, with 
only Saint Vincent and the Grenadines having more than 10 per cent 
adult illiteracy. The Caribbean, however, shows a very uneven 
performance with regard to mean years of schooling, with highs in 
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago of more than 8 years and a low in 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines of 4.6 years. 
The final indicator used is the Human Development Index (HDI) 
itself. It must be pointed out that this indicator is used with 
some caution. The Administrator of the UNDP in his foreword to the 
report draws attention to the continuing methodological work taking 
place on the development of the index. This qualification 
notwithstanding, the HDI shows four countries scoring below . 700 on 
this composite indicator and only one (Guyana) having an index of 
less than .600. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing. 
First, at an aggregated level pockets of deprivation appear with 
less frequency in the Caribbean than it does in Latin America. 
Secondly, using the HDI, deprivation , when it does appear, is less 
severe in the Caribbean than it is in Latin America. 
This is not to minimize the nature of the social equity 
problem in the Caribbean. Rather it is to identify that the 
problem differs in its manifestations from that in Latin America, 
and accordingly, requires different treatments in analyzing and 
correcting. 
The most recently available work which can used to illustrate 
the dimensions of the problem in the Caribbean was done by 
individual countries in the Caribbean for the purposes of 
determining the effect of structural adjustment policies on the 
respective countries. They are a series of country papers which 
were presented at the Caribbean Round Table on Structural 
Adjustment and Employment, held in Port of Spain in May 1991. The 
methodology and scope of these national studies varies and presents 
problems for comparison, however, they are useful in providing 
rudimentary data from which inferences can be drawn. 
Caribbean governments have sought over the years to deal with 
the question of social equity through direct intervention in the 
economy. It is to be noted that with the fairly strong levels of 
nominal growth in the 1960s and early 1970s many Caribbean 
governments sought to ensure that there was some redistribution of 
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wealth through large investments in new enterprises and the 
nationalization of already existing ones. This was especially the 
case in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Governments also sought to achieve greater social equity 
through expanded employment creation in public works and increases 
in welfare transfers. Relevant data further show that there were 
steady increases in the proportion of national recurrent revenue 
spent on health and education in most countries. 
Table VI 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION 
Percentage of the Gross Domestic Product 
at current prices 

































5.9 • • • 
5.5 
5.9 
5.9 • • • 
5.6 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 1992. 
Table VI shows Public Expenditure on Education as a percentage 
of gross domestic product at current prices for Barbados, Guyana, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago over the period 1970 to 1987. In 
the case of the first three countries it is possible to observe 
increasing expenditure in current prices on education, peaking in 
the early 1980s and showing a secular decline after that. Similar 
conclusions can be drawn on an examination of expenditure on health 
during the same period (Table VI refers). 
The proportional increases in expenditure on health and 
education for Trinidad and Tobago can best be explained by a 
convergence of two principal factors. On the one hand, the 
contracting economy, and on the other fixed costs that were 
resistant to reductions, largely personnel. A more detailed 
examination of the Trinidad and Tobago expenditure on health and 
education should reveal that in real prices, expenditure had 
actually fallen. 
In effect, it is possible to argue that the governments of the 
Caribbean have always placed emphasis on social equity and have 
sought within the limits of national constraints to attempt 




PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON HEALTH 
Percentage of the Gross Domestic Product 
at current prices 
Country 1970 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Barbados 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.1 3.9 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.2 
Guyana 2.1 4.1 4.4 4.9 4.0 3.7 4.2 4.0 4.4 
Jamaica 2.0 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.5 2.9 « o e « » « 
Trinidad/Tobago • « • 1.3 1.5 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.2 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 1992. 
from the foregoing. First, were these efforts successful at the 
time of their implementation? Secondly, even if they were, are 
they sustainable in the radically changed economic circumstances in 
which the Caribbean must now operate? 
Assessing the success of traditional attempts to address the 
provision of social equity requires that these be placed in proper 
historical, economic and social context. Attempts at increasing 
expenditure on health, education and welfare are feasible only as 
long as there is an expanding revenue base. It might be noted in 
passing that an additional attraction of these direct transfer 
policies is that they also meet immediate needs in addition to 
promotion of human capital formation. However, even if there is 
expanding capacity to accommodate such increases in expenditure the 
question remains whether benefits reach those most deserving of 
them. It is quite possible that rather than the segments of the 
population most in need accessing these benefits, that they find 
themselves going to already advantaged and thus rather than 
creating greater social equity, these polices can actually worsen 
the distribution. 
In addition to these fundamental issues of the efficiency of 
the policies, as we have noted, the revenues available to 
governments have decreased markedly in the last 12 years, bringing 
their very viability into question. 
Further, governments' attempts at direct involvement in the 
economy have proved to be inefficient in most cases in the 
Caribbean, with government-run enterprises, including subsidized 
utilities creating serious strains on the national resources. From 
the 1960s until the 1980s the countries in the Caribbean show rapid 
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increases in the size of the public sector, especially in the 
numbers employed directly by governments. It was not unusual to 
find countries with as much as 60 per cent of annual recurrent 
revenue absorbed by personnel costs. 
It becomes obvious then that since attempts to address social 
equity were all based on transfers of surplus revenue, in the 
absence of such revenue, an erosion of equity can be expected. 
In Trinidad and Tobago, it is estimated that between 1982 and 
1990 real GDP per capita fell by more than 28 per cent. By 1991, 
estimates of absolute poverty were 15 per cent of the total number 
of households, while relative poverty estimates were put at 25 per 
cent of the total number of households. 
The case of Jamaica is comparable. It is estimated that 
between 1977 and 1987 real compensation per employee fell by 22 per 
cent. Guyana's data shows the decline to be more than 20 per cent. 
What these data do not show is that the impact of these losses fell 
hardest on the poorest sectors of the population. 
In every country in the Caribbean, the government is the 
single largest employer. Government employees tend to be less 
well-trained and less skilled than those in the private sector. It 
could also be argued that there is a correlation between government 
employees and the disadvantaged sectors of the economy. Losses in 
government jobs will therefore impact hardest on these sectors. 
What is worse is that there is a major generational problem in the 
structure of unemployment in the Caribbean, with the age group 15-
24 exhibiting significantly higher levels of unemployment than 
other cohorts. 
In the face of this worsening situation, there has been a 
political backlash. In most countries, especially in Jamaica, 
Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago the blame for these conditions has 
been placed at the door of structural adjustment policies. This 
paper has maintained that while considerable damage has been done 
by these policies, the stage had been set by the patterns of 
production that pre-existed the introduction of the structural 
adjustment paradigm. 
Reaction by governments to the increasing poverty in the 
region and the accompanying outcry by large segments of the 
population has been framed in the context of structural adjustment. 
The governments of the most affected countries have sought to 
introduce compensatory policies. Many of these programmes have 
been designed under the guidance of international financial 
institutions and in some cases have been funded by these 
institutions. Their impact has been uneven at best. More than 
that, however, the entire philosophical basis of these compensatory 
policies may well be called into question, since they do not 
challenge the basic assumptions of the structural adjustment 
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paradigm, which while not exclusively responsible for the 
difficulties faced by Caribbean countries, is certainly a major 
contributor to the increase in poverty. 
There is very little information on the demographic and 
geographic distribution of poverty within the countries of the 
Caribbean. A number of points can be raised though. In the first 
place, given the size of most of the countries (Guyana, Belize, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, being the major exceptions), 
analyses of a rural-urban dichotomy on the distribution of poverty 
are not totally appropriate. Accordingly, a strategy to address 
social inequities in this context should only be pursued with 
extreme caution. 
One factor that has been confirmed in the Caribbean is the 
inter-generational perpetuation of poverty and therefore the need 
to seek to break that cycle. 
The problem of social equity is one that the countries of the 
Caribbean have attempted to address. The difficulty has been that 
the attempts to counter social inequities have been framed, in the 
context of the production patterns that prevailed. It has been 
argued above that the production patterns that have historically 
existed in the Caribbean have never been appropriate to the needs 
of the region. They have all shown inherent structural weaknesses 
and have been unsuitable to the task of laying a basis for 
sustained growth and development. Since the attempts to achieve 
social equity have been built on these patterns it can be suggested 
that if the production patterns have been unsuitable then the 
strategies to achieve social equity will also be inappropriate, 
A framework for development for the Caribbean 
Caribbean development strategies must first of all be 
indigenous. As we noted above, development strategies in the 
region have tended to be externally dictated and have proved to be 
unresponsive to the aspirations and needs of Caribbean peoples. It 
must be noted that an indigenous development strategy does not at 
all imply an inward-looking strategy. 
It is useful to make a comparison between the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean on the one hand and the countries 
of Asia on the other, In so doing, it can be observed that the 
strategies of development in most Asian countries were designed by 
those countries taking into consideration local conditions with 
which they were most•familiar. They have been able to start the 
development process while keeping their debt burden low. In many 
respects they started off from objective positions that are less 
favourable than those that obtain in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 
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While the suggestion is not to attempt to replicate in its 
entirety the strategiies of Asia, the successes demonstrated in that 
region suggest that a development strategy must take into account 
the unique characteristics of a country and these must be addressed 
specifically, by those which are best acquainted with them. It 
does not matter whether after such an examination has been made it 
is determined that given the circumstances of the region the most 
appropriate strategy is one that is externally-oriented. The 
methodology used in devising the strategy is as important as the 
strategy itself. It might even be argued that the methodology is 
more important than the strategy, especially when factors such as 
social consensus and broad-based participation are taken into 
consideration. 
It is expected that the sum of the policy suggestions made 
below will be to boost the international competitiveness of the 
subregion. 
An attempt will now be made to place in the Caribbean context 
some of the variables explored by the Santiago document as 
essential parts of the integrated approach. 
HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 
With the exception of Guyana and Belize, all the countries of 
the Caribbean have fairly high population densities. (See Table 
I) . In addition, given the paucity of natural resources, the 
importance of the human resources of the countries of the region 
takes on an additional significance. It is therefore lamentable 
that for the most part, human resources development in the 
Caribbean has been approached from a piecemeal perspective, if it 
has been given any consideration. 
The goal of any development strategy is ultimately the 
improvement of the human condition of ia society. It is therefore 
contradictory to engage in a development strategy that expects to 
and causes hardship on the human resources in a country. Further, 
human resources are not only the object of development but they are 
also the instrument of development. It is therefore true to say 
that if a country is unable to develop its human resources it 
cannot build anything else. 
It must, therefore, always be borne in mind that whereas human 
resources development is viewed as a tool in the broader goal of 
national development, human resources development must always be 
seen as an end in itself, for raising the dignity and perceptive 
self-worth of the individuals involved. An adequate and relevant 
human resources development programme must be part of a total 
education, health and welfare policy. 
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In a development strategy which emphasizes the attainment of 
economic production targets to the neglect of the improvement of 
the human condition, ultimately it is a self-defeating strategy. 
This is, in essence, one of the central points of the integrated 
approach. 
Â comprehensive human resources development strategy has 
several aspects to it. These include education, training and re-
training (with an emphasis on training for productive employment), 
health provisions and welfare. 
The Caribbean countries exhibit fairly high standards in the 
areas of health and education. What has been observed, however, is 
that given the prevailing economic paradigm of structural 
adjustment, the relative, and in some cases, the absolute 
expenditure on these areas have suffered. In effect, the 
appearance is given that the object of economic growth is at best 
an end in itself, if not to ensure that the international financial 
obligations of states are met. The importance of the human factor 
fades into the background. 
It has to be accepted that if the total resources of a country 
are either contracting or not expanding, then the provision of 
services will have to be contained. In light of the economic 
difficulties being experienced, there has to be some creativity 
which will ensure that there is minimum disruption in the provision 
of social services. To address these issues, countries will first 
have to determine the dimensions of the problem. As noted in the 
data in Table III the countries of the Caribbean exhibit fairly 
high levels of access to social services. There is a need, 
however, to determine the access to these services by various 
income groups. Beyond that, the delivery systems of social 
services have to be addressed. 
Education 
Education has played an important role in the improvement of 
social status in the Caribbean. The countries of the subregion 
uniformly display high literacy rates and access to primary 
education. However, the available data show a structural weakness 
in the education system that promotes an elitist bias. There is a 
steady and steep decline in the representative nature of other 
indicators of education and human capital formation. 
Two things are obvious. In the first place, while there is 
quite widespread access to the fundamentals of education, there 
needs to be greater access beyond these rudimentary levels. In 
addition, and perhaps of greater importance, is the need for a 
strategy that will move education in the region further away from 
the grammar school type to an orientation that is more functional 
for modern production. A comparison between the countries of the 
24 
Caribbean, for which data are available, and two Asian countries, 
the Republic of Kore^ and Singapore with regard to the production 
of scientists and technicians instructive (Table Vlll). Besides 
the relative elitism of tertiary education in the Caribbean, it is 
clear that there is also an obvious structural deficiency in the 
product of the education system, calling into question its adequacy 
to cater for modern competitive production. 
Table VIII 
HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION 
Tertiary 
Scientists R & D Graduates 
& technicians Scientists as a % of 
Mean years of per 1,000 & technicians corresponding 
schooling people per 10,000 age group 
Country 1990 1985-89 1985-89 1986-88 
Barbados 8.9 11.6 • • • • • • 
Guyana '5.1 2.3 3.4 1.1 
Jamaica 5.1 6.2 0.1 2.0 
Trinidad/Tobago 9.0 • • • 4.1 1.2 
Korea, Rep. 8.8 47.3 21.6 
Singapore 3.9 23.6 • • • 3.1 
Source: Human Development Report, 1992. 
These structural difficulties have been heightened by the 
financially difficult times faced by most countries. For the most 
part countries in the region have attempted to avoid any 
significant reduction in the public commitment to education as 
expressed in terms of public expenditure on education. There has 
had to be a re-ordering of priorities, especially since countries 
are now required to make available more of their national income 
for debt servicing. Given these constraints, it becomes even more 
important to ensure that the quality and direction of education 
offered are in keeping with the needs of the society. 
Health 
Based on the available data, a rudimentary health profile 
could be constructed for six countries in the region; these data, 
while acknowledged to be incomplete provide some useful indicators 





Pop» with Popo with Pop. with mortality Expenditure 
access to access to access to rate per on health 
health safe sanitation 100,000 as % Of GNP 
Country services % water % % live bir. 1960 1987 
Antigua 100 o o 0 • e • 
Barbados iôô 100 35° 4.0 
Belize 75 69 51 • 9 • • • e • • • 
Jamaica 90 72 91 120 2.0 2.8 
Guyana 89 81 86 200 4.4 
Trinidad/Tobago 99 96 99 120 1.7 3.2 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 1992. 
Taken together with the indicators on the public expenditure 
on health (Table VII), the suggestion is that there has been an 
effort to keep expenditure on health as constant as possible when 
expressed as a percentage of national income. This notwithstanding 
it must be remembered that in the acquisition of drugs and other 
supplies the relative costs of these rose as a result of the 
successive devaluations in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
So much so that these countries have been plagued repeatedly in 
recent years by shortages of drugs and other imported medical 
supplies. 
The importance of size as a factor determining access to 
social services is also obvious. There would appear to be problems 
of delivery of services in the larger countries of the region, 
especially in rural areas. 
What is necessary for the Caribbean therefore, is a focus on 
the composition of health expenditure. The emphasis will have to 
be laid on the delivery of primary health care, especially the 
construction and improvement of district health centres and the 
placement of public health personnel within easy reach of most of 
the population. In those countries which already have excellent 
access to health services, attention has to be paid to upgrading 
the level of services. 
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EMPLOYMENT AMD PRODUCTIVITY 
The structure of employment 
In any development strategy for the Caribbean there is a 
centrality of the need for employment creation. Productive 
employment forms the basic platform for permitting the growth and 
development of each person, and by extension each country. 
The Caribbean region has traditionally suffered from 
comparatively high levels of unemployment. Comparative figures for 
the 1970s and 1980s demonstrate that unemployment has always 
proved to be resistant to governments' best efforts at manipulation 
of the economy. 
The most notable exception has been Trinidad and Tobago during 
the period 1974 and 1981. In this period of high oil prices, 
Trinidad and Tobago actually saw unemployment reduced to just 10 
percent. This relatively low rate of unemployment, which would be 
viewed as troublesome in developed countries as well as in the 
newly industrializing economies, could not be sustained once the 
price of oil started its decline in 1982. This is yet another 
demonstration of the fragility of the Caribbean economies and calls 
greater attention to the need for the establishment of policies 
that will be able to address this problem. 
Countries in the Caribbean have sought to address the question 
of unemployment through the mechanism of government employment 
programmes. These have been criticized from a number of 
perspectives. 
In the first place, productivity, though never rigorously 
measured, has been identified as being quite low. Many of these 
projects and programmes have been identified as only thinly 
disguised dole systems, in which governments engage in the transfer 
of resources. These programmes tend to be primary targets of the 
international financial institutions under structural adjustment 
policies. They, however, tend to provide some invaluable release 
for social pressures that could otherwise be explosive. 
Secondly, such projects have an almost built-in potential for 
corruption and accusations of political patronage. In some cases 
the beneficial effects of employment relief are negated in part by 
the problems of political interference or at least the appearance 
of such interference. 
The challenge therefore, is to view the make-work schemes of 
government programmes as transitory policies to provide relief 
while long-term systems are put in place to ensure the 
establishment of a basis for productive employment. 
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It has to be made clear and accepted by governments and the 
general population alike that unemployment is an intractable 
problem not given to quick fixes and must form part of a long-term 
strategy, starting with training and the education system. 
In this regard there is a conceptual task that must be 
considered. Regional planning has always addressed the 
unemployment problem from the supply side of the equation, rather 
than from the demand side. So much so that targets are set for the 
training in particular skills without sufficient consideration of 
what the demand for these skills would be. As a result, far too 
often there are disequilibria in the labour market. 
Labour market information system 
This calls into focus the need for the establishment of 
adequate manpower information systems. In the event that a 
manpower information system appears to be too much of a drain on 
scarce resources, a more rudimentary labour market information 
system (LMIS) may be appropriate. An LMIS could generate and 
disseminate information that is adequate and timely for policy 
formation, evaluation and implementation, as well as for 
operational decisions in the area of manpower planning, employment, 
employment services and training. 
Operationally, the system will have to take into account the 
interaction of the labour market or any part thereof and the 
related intentions and aspirations of the actors in the market. 
Its product will have to be timely, consistent and reliable 
information on the size, quality and composition of the labour 
force. 
Training and re-trainina for employment 
The changes in production patterns assume that there will be 
dislocation in the labour market. We have argued that there is 
centrality to productive employment for the achievement of social 
equity. The case may therefore be made for joint efforts between 
governments and the private sectors in the respective countries on 
programmes for job training and also for retraining in an effort to 
reduce employment dislocations. 
This perspective is informed by the increasing need for highly 
and specifically skilled workers. As methods of production change 
with new production patterns, governments and the private sector 
can play a proactive role in job training. 
The simplest form of cooperation is sharing of cost, either 
through government rebates to the private sector for approved 
training or through tax allowances for part or all of the costs 
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incurred by the private sector in training workers. It is 
important to avoid the government attempting to take on additional 
training responsibilities. 
It has been observed above that there are problems with 
governments' ability to deliver adequate numbers of appropriately 
trained workers; mechanisms should be explored to avoid compounding 
this situation. The needs of the productive sector can be best 
anticipated by those directly involved, and resources can be more 
directly and efficiently targeted to solve difficulties. 
Reorientation of employment priorities 
There is a chronic shortage of available investment capital in 
most of the countries of the region. This is coupled with 
declining prospects of increased investment flows from 
extraregional sources as the demand for available resources grows. 
It is therefore necessary to consider a comprehensive employment 
creation strategy that would minimize the cost of creating new 
jobs. The issue of maximizing, in a physical sense, the available 
resources is addressed elsewhere as is the issue of technical 
progress. There is a need, however, to consider whether far 
greater emphasis should not be placed on the creation of labour-
intensive employment. 
A review of many of the investment projects in the region will 
show that from as early as the 1960s, when the first experiments in 
investment by invitation took place, one of the criticisms was the 
high cost per job of such projects. Official reviews of planning 
goals lamented the failure to achieve employment goals. Over time, 
the average cost to create each job has increased. Given the large 
reserve of unused labour, there has to be a reassessment of the 
ratio of labour to capital with strategies devised in favour of the 
former. 
The role of the informal sector 
There is very little agreement on what comprises the informal 
sector. What is known, however, is that in all developed and 
developing countries, there are sectors of the economy that operate 
outside of the mainstream. It is admitted that the growth of the 
informal sector is a symptom of the failure of the economy of a 
country to function properly. It must be noted, however, that even 
within small countries there are wide divergences in the 
functioning and rewards of different subsectors of the informal 
sector. 
Notwithstanding the complexity of the informal sector and the 
exploitation that takes place at some levels, there is a need for 
this area to be addressed. At a very basic level, it may be useful 
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to make a distinction between activities in the informal sector 
that are conducted as a result of necessity as against activities 
that can be reasonably incorporated into the formal structures of 
the economy. 
Activities which fall into the former category include the 
higglers and hucksters of many of the countries of the Caribbean. 
The productive potential of such should be nurtured. The long-term 
view should be to provide the economy with the versatility that 
would allow the incorporation of such activities into the formal 
sector. Incorporation into the formal sector is important from two 
perspectives. First/ it could help ensure the protection of those 
involved in the informal sector and possibly maximize their 
returns. Secondly, it could prevent the leakage of national 
resources obtained iii the informal sector. 
There are other activities, however, which, while they can be 
readily accommodated within the formal structures, are conducted in 
the informal sector for the sole reason of circumventing law and 
regulations. These activities point to the need for a 
strengthening of the institutional structures to minimize the loss 
of government revenue. 
Government investment in employment 
Given the persistent shortage of investment funding in the 
region, there will always be a significant role for government in 
the direct creation of employment. In this area the challenge will 
have to be creation of long-term productive employment. It should 
be accepted that government will have to continue offering 
programmes of employment relief which may not live up to the 
exacting scrutiny of productivity tests. Such programmes will 
remain essential however, if only to ease social tensions among the 
hardcore unemployed and to contain potentially disruptive social 
pressures. 
These programmes must, however, never be seen as a permanent 
solution to the problem. While it is admitted that such employment 
programmes may never fulfil all desires for productivity levels, 
there are mechanisms that can be put into place that will allow for 
maximum benefits accruing to both participants and the population. 
First, in keeping with the arguments above, they seek to be as 
labour intensive as possible. Secondly, they should concentrate as 
far as possible on the development of infrastructure. It is noted 
that as a result of many of the financial difficulties faced by 
countries in the region, there has been a serious deterioration of 
physical infrastructure and a nexus could be created between 
government employment programmes and the rehabilitation of 
infrastructure. Thirdly, these programmes should be as 
participatory and community-based as possible. Community-based 
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projects usually result in higher levels of productivity, since the 
participants have a direct stake in the outcome. Fourthly, 
monitoring systems should be put in place to buttress the inherent 
commitment of workers to community-based projects. Fifthly, 
mechanisms for selection of labour should be transparent to ensure 
participation over time by as many of the unemployed as possible. 
TECHNOLOGICAL 3UDVANCEMENT 
Within the last 20 years there has been a growing emphasis on 
the role of science and technology in development. In response to 
the growing number of international initiatives on science and 
technology in development, Caribbean countries have given continued 
verbal, and often very vocal, support to the need to increase the 
region's capacity to absorb, develop and apply technology. This, 
however, has not always been matched by positive well-coordinated 
government support to give effect to these desires. 
In 1988, CARICOM Ministers Responsible for Science and 
Technology adopted a regional programme for science and technology. 
The policy has not yet been approved by the Conference of Heads of 
Government. Of the countries of the region, only Jamaica has 
developed a national policy on science and technology. 
In the region, there is a cadre of experts who have been able 
to conceptualize science and technology as it relates to the 
development and growth of the Caribbean. Unfortunately, there has 
been some distance between the conceptual level and the operational 
level of science and technology. It is possible to identify three 
areas that must be addressed if the Caribbean is to effectively use 
technical advancements. 
There must be a formulation of policy in which the connections 
between research on the one hand, and the expansion of the national 
economy is appreciated. At the level of principal decision makers, 
scientific research and development must be seen as productive and 
essential work for economic growth rather than a luxury. 
As a result of the financial constraints that have 
characterized the region over the last decade, it has been possible 
to observe a down-scaling of the already limited research capacity 
that exists. The Caribbean Industrial Research Institute (CARIRI) 
of Trinidad and Tobago, the Scientific Research Council (SRC) of 
Jamaica and the Institute of Applied Science and Technology (lAST) 
of Guyana have all experienced cutbacks in their budgetary 
allocation. Such an approach to the development of a technical 
capacity is contradictory and is indicative of the failure to make 
the connection between technical progress and economic growth. 
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Beside directly promoting a general research capacity, there 
is a need to nurture private initiatives, as was the case in 
Barbados with the development of solar water heaters. 
The foregoing are matters that can be addressed immediately 
and produce results in the short term. There is need, however, to 
engage in long range strategies which will programme science and 
technology into the education system. 
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At present, the access to technological literacy is too 
restricted and in large measure open only to those who can afford 
it. We noted in the discussion on education that compared with 
countries which have made rapid progress to transforming their 
economies the Caribbean structure of education does not place 
sufficient emphasis on the production of graduates in the fields of 
science and technology. 
To address this issue there is a need for long-term strategy 
focused on the education system and starting at the primary level 
which would, in a concerted effort, re-socialize future Caribbean 
generations to "think technologically". 
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT 
A development strategy, especially a radical development 
strategy does not occur in a vacuum. There is a need to ensure 
that adequate institutional supports are in place to serve two 
primary functions. In the first place, institutional supports must 
act as a fillip to change; facilitating advancement and enhancing 
the quality of the change. Secondly, institutional supports are 
important for cushioning any dislocations that may result from the 
process of change. 
Public administration 
Despite the best efforts in many countries, the public 
administration systems in the Caribbean have failed to act as 
agents of change. Indeed, the complaint remains that these 
structures continue to retard progress. In most countries in the 
Caribbean, investment is hampered by severe bureaucratic overlap 
and the need for multi-agency approvals. Given the existing 
shortage of investment funds, unhelpful structures only place 
additional burdens pn the development strategy. 
.Finar>cial administration 
Increasing levels of direct taxation will not be a 
particularly rewarding course of act 
32 
Caribbean. The incidence of taxation in the Caribbean is 
comparatively higher than in Latin America and the Caribbean as a 
whole (See Table X) ̂  The greater need appears to be for a 
streamlining of the administration and collection procedures in an 
effort to reduce tax evasion. 
Table X 
TAX REVENUE 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
As a percentage of GDP 
Caribbean (1990) 





Saint Kitts and Nevis 17 
Saint Lucia 29 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 27 
Trinidad and Tobago 26 
Source: Caribbean Development Bank: Social and 
Economic Indicators, 1990. 














Source: Social Equity and Changing Production 
Patterns: An Integrated Approach, Santiago, 
1992. 
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Social support policies 
A number of vulnerable groups, particularly sensitive to the 
changes that will take place under any strategy of growth have been 
identified. These include, infants and children, lactating 
mothers, women, youth, dislocated workers. 
Taking the 1960s as a starting point, the countries of the 
Caribbean have made impressive progress in the establishment of 
social security schemes. In 1965, Jamaica enacted legislation to 
provide for a compulsory social insurance scheme covering old age, 
death and invalidity. This lead was followed in 1966 by Barbados, 
in 1969 by Guyana and in 1971 by Trinidad and Tobago. All these 
countries went further than the Jamaica model and added maternity 
and sickness benefits to the coverage. 
At the same time the smaller countries of the English-speaking 
Caribbean adopted a national provident-fund approach as a 
transition to the more comprehensive social insurance-based 
programme. There has been a continued, if uneven, trend toward 
greater coverage throughout the region with a focus on social 
insurance. In addition, most countries have expanded the benefits 
payable. By 1980, social insurance schemes in the English-speaking 
Caribbean had a coverage of more than 65 per cent of the labour 
force, with Bermuda having 97 per cent labour force coverage and 
Trinidad and Tobago having coverage in excess of 80 per cent. 
There are three major difficulties facing Caribbean social 
insurance schemes. First, most of the schemes in the region are a 
variant of social insurance, based on contributions from both 
workers and employers. Tremendous strain has been placed on their 
viability as a result of the severe economic difficulties of the 
last decade with its rising unemployment and increases in failing 
businesses. 
Secondly, the investment portfolios of many of these schemes 
have been marked by an absence of reasonable spread. Consequently, 
there has been a bunching of investment which increases their 
relative exposure. This problem is seen in the extreme in Trinidad 
and Tobago where a large proportion of the National Insurance 
Scheme's investable funds were placed in domestic mortgages. With 
the downturn in thé economy most of this portfolio is non-
performing to the tune of some TT$100 million. 
Thirdly, in many instances, there have been difficulties in 
keeping administrative costs within viable limits. Even more than 
that, there are schemes in which administrative costs consistently 
exceeded the statutory limits with no prospects in sight to correct 
the problem. 
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There is, therefore, a need for continued technical assistance 
to ensure the viability of these programmes which, if nurtured, 
have the capacity to support development in the region, both as a 
source of investment funding and through the provision of social 
safety nets. 
Social insurance schemes as exist in the Caribbean continue 
to exhibit some important gaps, particularly in the provision of 
benefits for the unemployed. In addition, benefits for widows and 
orphans continue to be tied to the contributions made by an insured 
person during his\her working life. 
Most countries attempt to provide some relief in the form of 
old age pensions, and social assistance grants to school-age 
children. Nevertheless, coverage for many vulnerable sectors of 
the population remains shallow and uneven throughout the region, 
dependent on the immediate financial position of the government 
concerned. 
Trade unions have been calling for the establishment of 
unemployment insurance. The dislocations that necessarily 
accompany a strategy of change necessitate a formula to provide 
unemployment relief for workers in transition. The problem in this 
regard remains a viable funding mechanism. The one attempt 
actually made in Barbados, proved unsuccessful. 
PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT 
The countries óf the Caribbean have a history of liberal 
democracy. since independence, the peoples of the region have 
grown accustomed to the right to participate in the selection of 
their governments. In addition, in many countries in the region 
the turnout for elections is reasonable. 
The greater need is to carry the right of participation at the 
level of elections to a more general mobilization behind the 
policies of development. There is a tendency in the region for 
policy to be formed with a minimum of consultation. In small 
societies, consultation is not only more practical than it is in 
larger countries, but it is also more necessary if public support 
for change is to be promoted. 
It is also possible to observe that increasingly, the peoples 
of the Caribbean are prepared to demand higher levels of 
performance from their governments. There is a growing network of 
non-governmental organizations which seek to address, in a 
systematic way, many social and other issues. This trend will 
place increasing pressure on governments to ensure that the 
imperatives of social equity and the provisions of equal access are 
met. 
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The involvement of social partners in policy orientation can 
be facilitated with only minor adjustments of time and 
organization. 
The Caribbean has seen rapid growth in the development of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) over the last decade. 
Increasingly, these are becoming more sophisticated in their 
organization and articulation of the needs of society. They have 
also autonomously developed their own impressive networking system 
within countries and throughout the Caribbean. These organizations 
can form the basis for a two-way flow of information that could 
serve the needs of development. In this regard, the first Regional 
Economic Conference held in Port-of-Spain in January-February 1991, 
offered a framework and a pattern for creating consensus and 
cohesion. 
The most fundamental task, however, must be a reorientation on 
the part of official policy makers. The political elite of the 
region must acknowledge that those on whom policy would impact 
should be given the opportunity to make a meaningful input into 
those policies. Repeatedly the criticism is made that the 
governments and public administration structures of the countries 
display alarmingly high levels of arrogance and demonstrate a 
failure to recognize the inherent validity of the peoples' 
potential to contributing to their own governance. 
As a consequence, mobilization behind programmes continues to 
be difficult. It can also be argued, with reason, that the 
requirements of any development strategy, especially one that will 
require some sacrifice and dislocation, will necessitate the widest 
possible support among the population. Such support will not be 
forthcoming in the absence of the provisions for mass 
participation. 
COMPETITIVENESS 
The issue of international competitiveness has taken on an 
additional importance during the 1990s. The countries of the 
Caribbean have been the recipients over the years of a number of 
"preferential" trading arrangements. The provision of these has 
been a two-edged sword. While such arrangements serve the purpose 
of guaranteeing income in the short and medium term, they also 
serve to entrench economic structures that may not be in the long-
term interests of the country which benefits from them. 
Furthermore, over time these economic patterns become more 
difficult to alter even while their debilitating effects become 
more evident. The current consternation on the part of banana 
producers in the region, in the face of changes taking place in the 
European trading system, is evidence of this syndrome; 
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notwithstanding that: more than 25 years ago Caribbean economists 
were pointing to the dysfunctional dimensions preferential 
arrangements for this commodity. 
At present an additional imperative has been introduced in the 
name of international competitiveness. In the context of 
structural adjustment, Caribbean countries are being made to 
compete not only on the international marketplace, but there is an 
insistence that they must also compete for their own domestic 
markets. 
Trade liberalization is being foisted on the Caribbean with an 
almost indecent haste. While this paper has made reference to the 
abuses that have been made of protected domestic markets, and we 
have pointed to the need to correct some of these the dislocations 
that will result from liberalization without adequate safety nets 
being put into place are alarming. 
What is more, while multilateral financial institutions are 
calling for trade liberalization, many developed countries continue 
to maintain blatant examples of domestic protectionism. 
The implications of trade liberalization for business closures 
and consequent losses of domestic sources of employment as well as 
tax revenues will only serve to place additional strain on the 
social fabric of the region. 
One final word is in place concerning the impact of the 
divestment of government assets. Once more it is important to 
acknowledge that much of government's involvement in the productive 
economy has produced poor results. However, if there is a rush to 
divest the government of its holdings in the economy without 
adequate safeguards to ensure that some measure of national 
ownership is maintained, the people of the Caribbean will be robbed 
of a large part of the psychological underpinning of their 
independence. 
CONCLUSIONS 
All countries are increasingly influenced by the international 
context within which they operate. The international context is 
itself becoming increasingly contradictory. On the one hand there 
is every evidence of cooperation, which is a mark of growing 
interdependence, to solve a wide range of global issues. On the 
other hand, in many respects, the system is marked by the 
increasing self-interest of countries. For countries like those of 
the Caribbean which are small and have only limited strategic 
value, there is a greater need for creative approaches to deal with 
development of our societies. 
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The principal strength of the integrated approach lies in its 
attempt to force a nexus between social equity and more efficient 
methods of production. The need for social equity policies in the 
Caribbean may not be as obvious as it is for countries in Latin 
America. This may be so if only because the size of the Latin 
American countries multiplies the perception of inequities. 
Nonetheless, the problem of social inequities is very real in the 
Caribbean. Further, it is a worsening problem since the 
traditional ways in which governments sought to deal with the 
situation have proved to be unworkable as a result of changed 
domestic and international conditions. 
The countries of the Caribbean can ill-afford a worsening of 
social inequity. These societies are already quite fragile, with 
fragile social structures and may be unable to take the additional 
stress of exacerbated social disequilibria. 
On the other hand, the need for improved methods and patterns 
of production is also an imperative. Caribbean production has been 
based on protected markets and it may no longer be possible to 
sustain these, making it even more important for indigenous action 
to solve national problems» 
A special problem faced in addressing these difficulties in 
the Caribbean is their size. Small countries tend to be more 
fragile than larger» ones. They are more susceptible to the 
negative influences of the international system. While small size 
increases their vulnerability to international influence it also 
reduces their scope for action to counteract these influences. 
The holistic basis of the integrated approach is an 
appropriate starting position for considering strategies of 
development. Its application to specific country situations must 
of necessity be varied to respond to local conditions. The 
temptation to grant greater importance to either improved 
production patterns or the attainment of social equity will 
continue. It is one that must be resisted. 

